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Mental health law permits and regulates the non-consensual
treatment of mental disorders. This stream of law has typically
focused on the status of the individual as a person with
mental disorder. If the presence and severity of mental
disorder are established formally, non-consensual treatment
decisions may be justified, principally to reduce risk. The
abilities needed for patients to decide for themselves about
treatment have therefore tended to receive limited attention.1
A parallel stream of law has evolved aimed at safeguarding
the freedom of individuals from battery or assault in a
medical or surgical context. Inherent to this has been a
concept of decision-making capacity or competence (DMC)
as one of the necessary conditions for consent to be valid.
The terms ‘capacity’ and ‘competence’ have overlapping
meanings (and are used differently in North America and
the UK) and for the purposes of this paper we take them
to be equivalent. Although the concepts within this stream
of law are old, it was not until the late 20th century that
courts in the USA and UK began to systematically probe
the abilities needed to decide treatment for oneself. A focus
was on the decision-making abilities required for autonomous
treatment choice.2,3 Because of the different historical origins
of these two streams of law it became natural to think that
DMC law was for medical and surgical patients only, yet the
concept of DMC has been applied increasingly to psychiatric
patients. In the USA in the 1960s and 1970s libertarianism and
the civil rights movement pressed states to recognise the right of
psychiatric patients to refuse psychotropic drugs.4 Attention was
directed towards reconceptualising mental health law in terms of
consent and DMC.5,6 In England, the Mental Capacity Act which
came into effect in 2007 now applies to any adult patient: medical
or psychiatric, in addition to extant mental health law.
Attempts to operationalise the abilities required to make
competent treatment decisions led to Grisso and Appelbaum’s
influential four abilities model based on an analysis of US case
law.2,7 This became the MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool
– Treatment (MacCAT-T). The four abilities – understanding,
appreciation, reasoning and expressing a choice – overlap with
the English legal definition (understanding, retaining, using and
weighing, and expressing a choice). Concerns have been expressed
that the DMC test, as currently understood, is ill adapted to the
distinctive features of psychiatric illness that may undermine DMC
which, it is argued, are unlike those seen in medical illnesses such as
delirium and dementia – being more related to values and less related
to cognitive processes.8,9 The MacCAT-T is a semi-structured
interview, probing: (a) understanding relevant information thereby
engaging in the process of informed consent; (b) appreciating that
the information is relevant to the patient’s predicament, not distorting
its reality; (c) reasoningwith the information in the sense of being able
to manipulate it logically; and (d) expressing a choice – at all or
without severe ambivalence. The MacCAT-T is a semi-structured
interview that involves prompts and probes as well as anchors for
scoring each ability on a short scale. The tool does not give a total score
and the abilities are considered distinct, nor is it designed to provide,
by itself, a simple binary (pass/fail) capacity assessment.
Cognitive impairment occurring in, for example, dementia or
intellectual disability may be reducible to measurable psychological
constructs (such as attention, memory), dysfunction of which
would be expected to have an impact most on understanding.
However, the psychopathology that may compromise competence
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Background
Is the nature of decision-making capacity (DMC) for
treatment significantly different in medical and psychiatric
patients?
Aims
To compare the abilities relevant to DMC for treatment in
medical and psychiatric patients who are able to
communicate a treatment choice.
Method
A secondary analysis of two cross-sectional studies of
consecutive admissions: 125 to a psychiatric hospital and
164 to a medical hospital. The MacArthur Competence
Assessment Tool – Treatment and a clinical interview were
used to assess decision-making abilities (understanding,
appreciating and reasoning) and judgements of DMC. We
limited analysis to patients able to express a choice about
treatment and stratified the analysis by low and high
understanding ability.
Results
Most people scoring low on understanding were judged to
lack DMC and there was no difference by hospital (P= 0.14).
In both hospitals there were patients who were able to
understand yet lacked DMC (39% psychiatric v. 13% medical
in-patients, P50.001). Appreciation was a better ‘test’ of
DMC in the psychiatric hospital (where psychotic and severe
affective disorders predominated) (P50.001), whereas
reasoning was a better test of DMC in the medical hospital
(where cognitive impairment was common) (P= 0.02).
Conclusions
Among those with good understanding, the appreciation
ability had more salience to DMC for treatment in a
psychiatric setting and the reasoning ability had more
salience in a medical setting.
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in psychiatric patients is likely to centre on the harder to
operationalise ‘use or weigh’ or ‘appreciation’ abilities. Our aim
therefore was to compare the underlying components of mental
capacity in two populations – acutely ill medical and psychiatric
patients – and to uncover which abilities were particularly having
an impact on judgements of DMC among those patients able to
express a choice.
Method
We made use of data from two previously reported, separate
studies. One comprised consecutive admissions to the acute adult
psychiatric wards of the Maudsley Hospital London10–12 and the
other consecutive admissions to the acute adult medical wards
of King’s College Hospital, London.13 The two hospitals are
adjacent and serve broadly the same inner-city catchment of South
East London, which is characterised by ethnic diversity and wide
disparities of health and wealth.14 The methods are reported in
detail elsewhere.12,13 The Joint South London and Maudsley and
the Institute of Psychiatry NHS Research Ethics Committee
approved the study.
Measurement of DMC
In both samples a clinician with more than 3 years’ training in
psychiatry and membership of the Royal College of Psychiatrists
assessed DMC. The DMC test is time- and decision-specific.
Patients were seen within a week of admission. The relevant
treatment decision was determined. In the psychiatric hospital this
was either a medication decision (if the treating team were mainly
recommending this to stabilise a mental state) or a decision to be
in hospital (for example if the treating team were recommending
admission as a means of reducing suicide risk). In the general
hospital the treatment decision was the most recently used inter-
vention to investigate or treat the main reason for admission (such
as intravenous antibiotics or an endoscopy).
The researcher conducted a clinical interview and used the
MacCAT-T to guide a binary capacity judgement based on the
English legal definition of DMC. Measurement of DMC therefore
took the form of MacCAT-T ability scores (continuous variables)
and a DMC judgement (binary variable). The scales for
appreciation and reasoning were comparable for the two samples,
although the scale for understanding was shortened from 0–6 to
0–4 in the medical sample. This limitation was accepted because
of practical constraints on obtaining and disclosing precise
information about diagnosis in acute medical settings where
patients were often undergoing diagnostic investigations.13
Previous research has shown that the interrater reliability of
the four abilities is generally good.15 For each of the samples we
conducted a reliability study wherein interviews were recorded
and transcribed, and transcriptions rated by a panel of senior
clinicians. These studies of binary DMC judgements yielded kappa
values exceeding 0.8, indicating excellent reliability.16,17
Analysis
Analyses were restricted to patients who were fully communicating
a choice (maximum scores on the ability to express a choice scale
of the MacCAT-T). This was done because we did not want to
include participants where the nature of DMC is clearly different
between medical and psychiatric patients (for example inability to
communicate a choice because of impaired consciousness) or
where interpretation of DMC is difficult (for example ambivalence).
To enable analysis of appreciation and reasoning, we stratified the
analysis by good and poor understanding – since we suspected
that these abilities are difficult to rate accurately when
understanding is poor. Analyses were conducted in Stata IC/10.1
on Windows to compute descriptive statistics, simple significance
tests as well as perform receiver operating characteristic (ROC)
analysis and logistic regression tests for effect modification.
Results
Our previous papers provide detailed descriptions of participation
rates and differences between participants and non-participants.
For the medical sample, we attained a participation rate of 53%,
and completed 159 assessments, with 34 participants not fully
expressing a choice, leaving a sample of 125 (79%) participants
in the present analyses. For the psychiatric sample, we achieved
a participation rate of 57% and assessed 200 participants. Of these,
36 individuals did not fully express a choice, leaving 164 (82%)
participants for the present analysis. Table 1 shows the
demographic features of the two groups. As expected, the
psychiatric sample was younger, had more men, more individuals
from Black and minority ethnic groups, more single people and
more people living in supported accommodation than the medical
sample. Table 1 also describes the principal diagnoses in the two
groups. In the medical sample, cardiac, respiratory and infectious
disorders dominated. Delirium and dementia were not listed as
principal diagnoses, however 25% of the sample had impairments
on the Mini-Mental State Examination (MMSE524)19 indicating
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Table 1 Demographic and clinical characteristics, and
principal diagnoses (ICD-10 categories)18 of the two samples
Medical hospital
(n=125)
Psychiatric hospital
(n=164)
Characteristics
Age, years: mean (s.d.) 62.7 (20.5) 39.6 (11.5)
Male, n (%) 61 (49) 107 (65)
Ethnicity, n (%)
White 105 (84) 89 (54)
Black 18 (14) 65 (40)
Other 2 (2) 10 (6)
Married/partner, n (%) 37 (30) 24 (15)
Living situation, n (%)
Alone 58 (46) 73 (45)
With family 57 (46) 50 (30)
Supported accommodation 9 (7) 22 (13)
Other 1 (1) 19 (12)
Without DMC, n (%) 37 (30) 85 (52)
Principal diagnosis, n (%)
Cardiac 34 (27)
Respiratory 30 (24)
Infectious 19 (15)
Neurological 7 (6)
Gastrointestinal 6 (5)
Alcohol-related 7 (6)
Haematological 3 (2)
Cancer 2 (2)
Endocrine 2 (2)
Unknown medical disorder 15 (12)
Psychotic episode 40 (24)
Schizophrenia or related 34 (21)
Unipolar depression 39 (24)
Bipolar affective disorder
Manic episode 17 (10)
Depressive episode 6 (4)
Personality disorder 14 (9)
Post-traumatic stress disorder 3 (2)
Organic brain syndrome 4 (2)
Other psychiatric disorder 7 (4)
DMC, decision-making capacity.
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cognitive impairment and such impairments were strongly
associated with DMC.13 In the psychiatric sample, psychotic
episodes, schizophrenia and affective disorders (bipolar and
unipolar) were the primary diagnoses in over 80% of participants.
Previous analysis of age, gender and ethnicity showed that these
variables were not associated with DMC independent of mental
disorder.11,13 Further analysis in the sample used for the present
analysis was consistent with this interpretation (not presented).
The scores for each ability according to DMC category and
setting are shown in Table 2. Unsurprisingly, in each group,
patients without DMC showed poorer performance on each
ability. Although reasoning and appreciation had the same scales
in each sample, understanding was on a 0–4 scale in the medical
sample and a 0–6 scale in the psychiatric sample complicating
direct comparison. The understanding scores showed a similar
distribution in both samples. The median understanding score
was shifted towards the middle of the scale in those without
DMC and was at the top of the scale in those with DMC. In the
psychiatric sample the median was shifted towards the bottom
of the scale in patients without DMC and was around the mid-point
of the scale in the medical sample without DMC. In patients with
DMC the median for appreciation was at the top of the scale in
both samples. In the medical sample reasoning scores were shifted
down in patients both with and without DMC. In those without
DMC the median was shifted right to the bottom of the scale in
the medical sample, whereas it was in the top half in the psychi-
atric sample.
Table 3 shows the distribution of scores on appreciation and
reasoning in patients who had poor understanding and for whom
it is therefore difficult to engage in the process of informed
consent. The majority of patients with poor understanding lacked
DMC and there was no association between lacking DMC and
being in a medical or psychiatric hospital (81% v. 93%, d.f. = 1,
w2 = 2.12, P= 0.14). For individuals without DMC, other abilities
were also typically impaired – for example, 95% of the psychiatric
group also had poor appreciation and 100% of the medical group
also had poor reasoning. This table therefore indicates that if
understanding is poor it is unlikely that the patient will have
mental capacity and most patients will perform poorly on
other abilities. There were a handful of individuals in whom
understanding is assessed to be poor in whom capacity was judged
to be present, but this small group typically had good scores on
appreciation and/or reasoning.
If understanding was adequate (Table 3) then a greater
proportion of patients in the medical hospital had DMC
compared with the psychiatric hospital (87% v. 61%, d.f. = 1,
w2 = 18, P50.001). Table 3 indicates that patients with good
understanding who fail the test of DMC do so for different reasons
according to setting. In the medical patients, the small group with
good understanding who lacked capacity, typically had adequate
appreciation but all showed poor reasoning. For the psychiatric
patients with good understanding who failed the capacity test,
almost all had deficits in appreciation despite good reasoning.
These relationships are further explored in Tables 4 and 5.
Table 4 shows sensitivities and specificities of appreciation and
reasoning as though they were ‘tests’ of DMC in individuals with
adequate understanding, stratified by setting. This shows that for
medical patients, reasoning is a sound test for DMC – with high
sensitivity and specificity, whereas appreciation has a very low
sensitivity. For psychiatric patients the pattern is reversed:
appreciation has excellent sensitivity and specificity, but reasoning
appears a poor test, with low sensitivity.
When continuous scores of appreciation and reasoning were
used in patients with good understanding, areas under the receiver
operating curves differed significantly for both appreciation and
reasoning according to hospital type (Table 5). Appreciation was
a better predictor of impaired DMC in the psychiatric hospital
and reasoning a better predictor in the medical hospital. On a
more stringent test of effect modification by hospital site, this
interaction between site and ability was only significant for
appreciation (odds ratio for site6appreciation 0.16, P= 0.02;
odds ratio for site6reasoning 1.2, P= 0.72).
Figure 1 gives an overview of the abilities in patients without
DMC.
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics of legal abilities by hospital and decision-making capacity
Medical hospital Psychiatric hospital
Decision-making capacity, median (IQR) Decision-making capacity, median (IQR)
MacCAT-T ability Scale range With (n=88) Without (n=37) Scale range With (n=79) Without (n=85)
Understanding 0–4 4 (3–4) 2 (1–4) 0–6 6 (5–6) 4 (2–5)
Appreciation 0–4 4 (3–4) 2 (2–3) 0–4 4 (3–4) 1 (0–2)
Reasoning 0–8 5 (4–6) 1 (1–2) 0–8 8 (7–8) 5 (3–6)
Each MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool – Treatment (MacCAT-T) ability was significantly lower in people without decision-making capacity compared with people with it
(Mann–Whitney test; all P-values <0.0001).
Table 3 Patients with poor v. good scores on understandinga
Medical hospital, n (%) Psychiatric hospital, n (%)
Total With DMC Without DMC Total With DMC Without DMC
Poor understanding, total 31 (25) 6 (19) 25 (81) 40 (24) 3 (7) 37 (93)
Poor score on appreciation 1 (17) 17 (68) 1 (33) 35 (95)
Poor score on reasoning 2 (33) 25 (100) 0 (0) 29 (78)
Poor score on appreciation and reasoning 0 (0) 17 (68) 0 (0) 27 (73)
Good understanding, total 94 (75) 82 (87) 12 (13) 124 (76) 76 (61) 48 (39)
Poor score on appreciation 2 (2) 2 (17) 4 (1) 45 (94)
Poor score on reasoning 25 (30) 12 (100) 0 (0) 8 (17)
DMC, decision-making capacity.
a. A poor score for each ability was defined as less than or equal to the mid-point of each scale and a good score was defined as more than the mid-point of the scale.
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Discussion
Main findings
For most patients who are able to express a choice but in whom
understanding was rated to be poor, DMC was absent, and this
was unrelated to the type of hospital they were in. Among patients
able to understand information and express a choice, a higher
proportion lacked DMC in the psychiatric hospital compared with
the medical hospital (39% and 13% respectively). In these
patients, the medical patient sample typically had poor reasoning
associated with lack of DMC, whereas the psychiatric patients
typically had poor appreciation.
Strengths and limitations
This study has limitations. Formal diagnoses of dementia or
delirium were not made in the medical sample and psychiatric
comorbidity (such as depression) was not analysed. However,
the prevalence of cognitive impairment in this medical sample
was high at 25%, with a strong association to loss of DMC.13,20
The assessments conducted in these two studies were made by
different research clinicians at different times. This introduces the
possibility of observer biases. However, there was high interrater
reliability16,17 and the judgements of DMC were checked by the
same panel of experienced clinicians. We think it unlikely that
the interpretation of DMC changed significantly in the period
between the two clinical researchers’ work in the medical and
psychiatric hospital. We used psychiatrists to assess DMC – which
reflects usual clinical practice, and although DMC is a legal, social
and ethical concept the courts have looked to clinical expertise in
their rulings on DMC. Using doctors with knowledge of
psychopathology is therefore a strength of the study. However,
some might argue that anthropologists or other social scientists
may be better attuned than doctors to understand the
relationships between patients’ explanations and their cultural or
religious background.
The MacCAT-T has often been used to collect scores without
judgement of DMC and without clinical assessment, so a limitation
to this study may be the way the tool is incorporated into clinical
contexts and shaped by them with loss of objectivity. However, use
of earlier versions of the MacCAT-T in clinical settings along more
de-contextualised, psychometric lines received criticisms with
regard to validity.21 Its authors developed the MacCAT-T, in
part, to promote the incorporation of a tool into clinical and
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Table 4 Sensitivities and specificities of poor appreciation and poor reasoning as ‘tests’ for decision-making capacity in patients
with good scores on understandinga
Medical hospital (n=94) Psychiatric hospital (n=124)
Sensitivity Specificity Sensitivity Specificity
Poor score on appreciation 0.17 0.98 0.94 0.95
Poor score on reasoning 1.00 0.70 0.17 1.00
a. Good score on understanding was defined as more than the mid-point of the scale (i.e. 43 in the psychiatric hospital and 42 in the medical hospital).
Table 5 Hospital comparison of receiver operating characteristic (ROC) areas for appreciation and reasoning as tests of decision-
making capacity in patients with good understanding
Medical hospital Psychiatric hospital
n ROC area under curve n ROC area under curve w2 (d.f. = 1) P
Appreciation 94 0.69 124 0.97 11.83 0.0006
Reasoning 94 0.95 122 0.84 5.22 0.02
Poor appreciation
2 (17%)
Poor reasoning
12 (100%)
Poor appreciation
17 (68%)
Poor reasoning
25 (100%)
Poor appreciation
45 (94%)
Poor reasoning
8 (17%)
Poor appreciation
35 (95%)
Poor reasoning
29 (78%)
Good
understanding
12 (32%)
Poor
understanding
25 (68%)
Good
understanding
48 (56%)
Poor
understanding
37 (44%)
Medical
37
Psychiatric
85
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
Fig. 1 Patients able to express a choice but without
decision-making capacity.
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psychosocial assessment in a way that was both practical and
flexible.22 The MacCAT-T, although potentially reliable, has short
scales with limited ranges. The subscales have different ranges and
we were forced to use a fairly crude definition of impairment
(scoring below the halfway point on each scale). This limits
statistical analysis and was complicated by the different scales
we used for understanding in the two samples.
To our knowledge this is the first study to explicitly compare
patients in two settings – psychiatric and medical. Other studies
have described abilities in different diagnostic groups, but
typically have not compared these with the criterion of whether
the individual does or does not have DMC.23–26 We therefore
think this study adds helpful data to the literature. Next, we
consider the four decision-making abilities in relation to our data
before briefly discussing how our understanding of DMC might be
advanced.
Understanding
The understanding ability is a pre-requisite for a patient’s consent,
or refusal, to be ‘informed’. To assess understanding it is necessary
to ensure that information has been given to the patient in a
manner clear enough to be understood. Grisso & Appelbaum
advise beginning the capacity assessment with information
disclosure and to test whether the patient has understood it by
inviting them to paraphrase.22 Memory, language and attention
impairments are likely to interfere with this understanding ability
as are altered emotional states or thought disorder. There is a
question about how far the assessor, or systems around the
assessor, need to go to adjust for, augment or ‘scaffold’27 these
disabilities to enable the patient to understand. The general
principle is that assessment of DMC must ensure that lack of
DMC is not founded on poor understanding when understanding
has not been enabled or supported. The United Nations
Convention on the Rights of People with Disabilities28,29
emphasises a right to this kind of support and it also features in
DMC law.22,30
How is poor understanding related to DMC? Our data
indicate that poor understanding is usually inconsistent with
DMC; few patients with poor understanding were judged to have
DMC. But poor understanding alone does not seem to be the
determining factor. The few with poor understanding with
DMC had good appreciation or reasoning and those with poor
understanding without DMC almost always had poor appreciation
or reasoning as well. So we suggest that if there is lack of DMC with
poor understanding, this typically reflects not poor understanding
alone, but poor scores in two or all three of the abilities in question.
What of good understanding? Is it enough for DMC? Our data
indicate, in both medical and psychiatric settings, that it is not
enough. A fair percentage show good understanding but lack
DMC because of poor appreciation or reasoning. Our data
therefore suggest that poor understanding alone is neither a strong
necessary nor sufficient condition for a lack of DMC and that
understanding needs to be considered in relation to appreciation
and reasoning to have a bearing on DMC.
Appreciation
Grisso & Appelbaum22 suggest that a patient’s non-acknowledge-
ment of the diagnosis and recommended treatment should be
counted as a failure of appreciation only when patients’ choices
are based on premises (beliefs) that: (a) are substantially
irrational, unrealistic or a considerable distortion of reality, (b)
are the consequence of impaired cognition or affect, and (c) are
relevant to the treatment decision. Saks and colleagues31,32 have
elaborated on (a) with a concept of ‘patently false belief ’ with
the aim of finding a standard between, on the one hand,
impossible belief and, on the other, making doctors the final
authorities on truth. Grisso & Appelbaum characterise
appreciation as ‘the ability to apply the information abstractly
understood to his or her own situation’.22 Our data suggest that
this ability is a more critical variable for DMC in the psychiatric
hospital than in the medical hospital. The MacCAT-T however
only captures this ability with two questions and a 0–4 scale
(see the Appendix for the two questions and guidelines on rating
inability).
Reasoning
Decision-making capacity law separates the decision-making
process from the decision itself (otherwise the DMC test would
become an ‘outcome test’). Grisso & Appelbaum22 address this
by focusing on the ability to ‘manipulate information rationally’,
that is, ‘to engage in logical processes when using the information
that they have understood and appreciate in arriving at a decision’.
The essence of the ability, according to Grisso & Appelbaum, is
‘engaging in a process of weighing treatment options’. Caution
needs to be exercised in interpreting this as a procedural reasoning
standard, as there is plenty of evidence to suggest healthy human
decision makers do not conform reliably to formal reasoning.33,34
Caution also needs to be exercised in interpreting this as a
substantive reasoning standard because the Mental Capacity Act
2005 states ‘a person is not to be treated as unable to make a
decision merely because he makes an unwise decision’. Grisso &
Appelbaum adapt a loose standard and draw attention to the
connection that any reasoning inability must have to the disorder.
An example of the questions the MacCAT-T uses to probe the
reasoning ability is given in the Appendix together with the
guideline on rating inability. Our data suggest that the reasoning
ability is a more critical variable for DMC in the medical than
in the psychiatric hospital.
Values and evaluation
Values and evaluation is arguably a feature of all of the above
abilities20 but in relation to appreciation this seems particularly
salient. With regard to the patient with anorexia who values
thinness over and above life, Grisso & Appelbaum argue that
the evaluative inability is included in an inability to appreciate.35
On MacCAT-T appreciation, the person is being assessed, in effect,
on their ability to take reality as it is. How this is to be separated
from the value judgements of society in general and from medical
expertise in particular has been controversial as indeed has the
question of whether it ought to be so separated.36 The Mental
Capacity Act specifies DMC abilities somewhat differently to the
four-ability model. Instead of referring to appreciation and
reasoning abilities it specifies an ability to ‘use or weigh’. On
the question of evaluation we may ask what was in the minds
of the legislators when these words were being examined by
them. The following37 is an extract from an exchange between
the government minister (Baroness Ashton) and the leader of
the opposition (Earl Howe) in the House of the Lords during
the parliamentary passage of the Mental Capacity Bill. Earl Howe
sought to amend ‘use or weigh’ to ‘use, evaluate or weigh’.
Earl Howe: My question relates to individuals with depression. One of the features of
those who are afflicted with depression is that they do not view the world in a normal
way . . . their view of life is of something colourless; they are often preoccupied with
intense feelings of self-denigration; and they lack hope . . . the decision-making
process is skewed by those features of their illness. They do not use or weigh
information in a normal way . . .
Baroness Ashton of Upholland: I understand what the noble Earl, Lord Howe, seeks to
do, and I recognise that the amendment is probing. We think that the wording we
have used incorporates evaluation as well . . .
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Decision-making capacity assessment within the Mental Capacity
Act thus seems to require an assessment of evaluative ability via
‘use or weigh’.38
Advancing understanding of DMC
Although difficult concepts may only afford so much definitional
precision, clinicians working in medical or psychiatric settings
need to be aware of the relevant decision-making abilities and
guard against idiosyncratic or erroneous interpretation. Our data
suggest that clinicians, when assessing DMC, need to be sensitive
not only to the decision at issue and its gravity or risk39 but also to
the kind of disorder – i.e. whether it is medical or psychiatric.
Some may fear that this sort of sensitivity to diagnosis could
allow prejudicial assumptions to compromise the objectivity of
DMC assessment. We think two observations are in order in
connection with this concern. First, it is important to emphasise
that sensitivity to diagnosis in the assessment process is not at
all equivalent to a ‘status’ account of capacity or competence.
The best protection against prejudicial assessments is not
blindness to diagnosis, but insistence on a high standard of
reason-giving in the conduct of assessments. Second, we would
echo Gadamer’s warning about the so-called prejudice against
prejudice.40 The assessment of DMC is an interpretative
endeavour, and interpretation always takes place in a context in
which the interpreter arrives with orienting ‘pre-judgements’.
Eliminating pre-judgement altogether would not lead to objective
interpretation; it would make interpretation impossible.
Objectivity is thus best served when pre-judgements are
themselves responsive to evidence, subjected to critical scrutiny,
and open to challenge and revision.
In advancing our understanding of DMC, it is worth pausing
over one suggestive feature of Earl Howe’s description of the way
that depression can threaten DMC. He describes how the ‘world’
looks to the person with depression. Here the focus is not so much
on the processing of information in the production of a decision,
nor is the issue one of abnormal values. The question is rather
whether DMC can be threatened by the distinctive way in which
an individual encounters and makes sense of their world. Can
the nature of that encounter itself disrupt DMC? If so, does it
disrupt certain sorts of decisions but not others? Earl Howe’s
observation suggests that assessment of the ability to ‘use or
weigh’ can sometimes require a distinctive skill-set on the part
of the assessor:41 for example, the skills of understanding and
unpacking the ways in which people with depression encounter
the world in which their decisions must be made. More work will
be required to translate that understanding into publically
attestable judgements of whether such individuals have the
abilities to decide for themselves about treatment – literally, make
that decision their own.42
Implications
Decision-making capacity is a concept that now crosses
psychiatric and medical practice. Using a validated interview –
the MacCAT-T – we show some evidence that appreciation and
reasoning differ in their association with DMC judgements in
psychiatric and medical settings. Both the appreciation and
reasoning abilities and the ‘use or weigh’ abilities are normative
abilities in that they all derive their meaning from the right to
self-determination, or individual autonomy.42,43
Law can tend towards assumptions that medical in-patients
choose treatment autonomously and that psychiatric in-patients
are of ‘unsound mind’ in relation to treatment.44 Those assump-
tions are not well supported by evidence.12,13,15,45 Policy-making is
moving beyond these assumptions and debating whether DMC
law is evolving to recognise differences in kinds of mental disorder
or disability that obviate the need for two streams of mental health
law.46 This study adds data which, we hope, give some nuance to
this policy debate and helps clinical and legal practitioners
recognise that DMC assessment requires attention to the kind of
mental disorder or disability present, as well as to the kind of
treatment decision.
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Appendix
Examples from the MacCAT-T of how appreciation
and reasoning abilities are probed, with guidelines
on inability
Ability Example probe Guidelines on inability
Appreciation ‘That is what we [your
doctors] think is the
problem in your case.
If you have any reason
to doubt that, I’d like
you to tell me so.
What do you think?’
‘You might or might
not decide that this is
the treatment you
want – we’ll talk about
that later. But do you
think it’s possible that
this treatment might
be of benefit to you?’
Patient clearly does not agree that
he or she has the disclosed disorder,
with reasoning based on a delusional
premise or some other belief that
seriously distorts reality and does
not have a reasonable basis in
the patient’s cultural or religious
background.
OR
Patient believes that the symptoms
are related to circumstances other
than a medical/psychiatric disorder
(e.g. psychotic symptoms seen as
consequences of work-related stress).
OR
Patient clearly disagrees with
symptoms or disorder, but with no
comprehensible explanation offered.
Patient acknowledges at least some
potential for the treatment to produce
some benefit, but for reasons that
appear to be based on a delusional
premise or a serious distortion of
reality.
OR
Patient does not believe that the
treatment has the potential to produce
any benefit, and offers reasons that
appear to be delusional or a serious
distortion of reality.
Reasoning ‘You think that
treatment X might be
best. Tell me what it is
that makes that seem
better than the others.’
Patient can make no comparative
statements.
Decision-making capacity in psychiatric and medical in-patients
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